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PRECEDENTIAL 
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   Respondent 
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER  
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A093- 306- 556) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew Arthur 
______________ 
 
Argued April 11, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed: September 14, 2012) 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Zaman Sattaur Hanif (“Hanif” or 
“Petitioner”) seeks review of the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)1 finding him statutorily 
ineligible for relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).2  
Applying the precedent of Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 219 (BIA 2010), the BIA found that Hanif was a lawful 
permanent resident (“LPR”), and that his date of admission 
was May 17, 2006, the date he was granted LPR status.  Thus, 
he had not satisfied the seven years of continuous residence 
required by the statute.  Hanif argues that the language of the 
statute is clear, and that he has never been “admitted”3
                                                 
 1 In lieu of issuing its own opinion, the BIA adopted 
and affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). 
 to the 
 
 2 The BIA based its decision on the following sentence 
in subsection (h):  “No waiver shall be granted under this 
subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been 
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if either since the date of such admission 
the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the 
alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United 
States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately 
preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the 
alien from the United States.”   
 
 3 “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with 
respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the 
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United States “as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”4
 For the reasons set forth below, we find that the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face.  
Therefore, we will accord no deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation, which we find to be at odds with the wording 
and clear meaning of the statute.  We will grant the petition, 
vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  Rather, he acquired his LPR status while in the 
United States, never having been admitted for that purpose.    
I. Facts/background 
 Hanif is a citizen of Guyana currently detained by 
immigration authorities pending the outcome of his removal 
proceedings.  Although the exact details are not clear, Hanif 
entered the United States on a fraudulent visa at some point 
during the 1980s.5
                                                                                                             
United States after inspection and authorization by an 
immigration officer.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).   
  After his marriage to Shakirah Hattim, a 
 
 4 “The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence’ means the status of having been lawfully accorded 
the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as 
an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such 
status not having changed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). 
 
 5  An August 11, 2009 Presentence Investigation 
Report (“PSI”) prepared for the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York states that Hanif 
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naturalized citizen, Hanif applied for a waiver of his ground 
of inadmissibility.  On May 17, 2006, a New York 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted Hanif’s application and 
adjusted Hanif to LPR status.  Prior to his detention, Hanif 
resided in the Bronx, New York with his wife and two 
children.  Also living in the Bronx area are Hanif’s parents 
and five siblings, all either naturalized citizens or lawful 
permanent residents.   
 According to the PSI, in June of 2008, Minoutie 
Khadoo, a girlfriend of Hanif’s nephew, was arrested for 
possession of a forged instrument.  In exchange for reduced 
charges against Khadoo, Hanif turned over $5,100 in 
counterfeit bills to the New York State Office of Tax 
Enforcement (“OTE”) and offered to cooperate and work 
with the OTE and the United States Secret Service in their 
ongoing counterfeiting investigation.  However, after a 
request by the Secret Service to take a polygraph 
examination, Hanif fled the country.  On August 22, 2008, a 
warrant for Hanif’s arrest was issued by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  
 In early December 2008, the Secret Service was 
notified that Hanif would fly to the United States from 
                                                                                                             
admitted to entering the United States illegally as an adult in 
the 1980s.  The PSI noted that Hanif “stated that he entered 
the United States illegally,” approximately two years after his 
parents immigrated in 1986.  The PSI also stated that 
“according to the Pretrial Services Report, the defendant 
advised that he illegally immigrated to the United States in 
1984.”  (Admin. R. 156.) 
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Guyana to surrender.  Hanif arrived at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport on December 16, 2008.  He was arrested 
and paroled into the United States for purposes of prosecution 
for counterfeiting.  On May 12, 2009, Hanif pled guilty to 
dealing in counterfeit United States currency, 18 USC § 473, 
and, on September 8, 2009, was sentenced to four months in 
prison.     
 On December 8, 2009, the Department of Homeland 
Security served Hanif with a “Notice to Appear,” charging 
him with inadmissibility by virtue of his federal conviction 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C., § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).6  On January 21, 2010, Hanif conceded 
his inadmissibility as charged.  Hanif then sought a waiver of 
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)7
                                                 
 6 Section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that “any alien 
convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits 
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . 
a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely 
political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such 
a crime” is ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be 
admitted to the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).    
 and submitted the 
 
 7 The pertinent clause in section 1182(h) reads “[n]o 
waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an 
alien who has previously been admitted to the United States 
as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either 
since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted 
of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided 
continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 
7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of 
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corresponding I-601 Application for Waiver on Ground of 
Excludability on February 17, 2010, claiming that removal 
would cause extreme hardship to his wife and children.   
 On January 11, 2011, an IJ denied Hanif’s application, 
finding him ineligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), 
pursuant to the BIA’s decision in Matter of Koljenovic.  
Specifically, the IJ noted that “the Board of Immigration 
Appeals held [in Matter of Koljenovic
II.   Jurisdiction 
] that an alien who 
entered the United States without inspection and later 
obtained lawful permanent residence [sic] status through 
adjustment [of] status has previously been ‘admitted as a 
lawful permanent resident, and therefore, must satisfy the 
seven year continuous residence requirement at Section 
212(h).’”  (Admin. R. 53-54.)  On May 27, 2011, the BIA 
adopted and affirmed the IJ’s order.  On June 17, 2011, Hanif 
petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s decision.        
 The BIA has jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  In general, “courts of appeals 
. . . have no jurisdiction to review [the BIA’s] discretionary 
and factual determinations presented in petitions for review.”  
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007).  
However, this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D), to review the BIA’s final order for 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  See Sukwanputra 
v. Gonzales
                                                                                                             
proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006) (“By virtue of 
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§ 1252(a)(2)(D), constitutional claims or questions of law 
raised in a petition for review elude the jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions of the INA.”).  Petitioner challenges the BIA’s 
statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), thus raising a 
question of law within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
Accordingly, we can exercise jurisdiction over this petition 
for review.     
III. Standard of Review 
 When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, 
rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not 
that of the IJ.  Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  When, however, the Board adopts and affirms the 
IJ’s decision, as it did here, we have authority to review both 
decisions.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“Inasmuch as the BIA deferred to the IJ’s 
credibility determinations and adopted the reasons the IJ set 
forth, we have authority to review both determinations.” 
(quoting Chen v. Ashcroft
 “The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for 
substantial evidence.”  
, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 
226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  
We review legal determinations de novo, subject to the 
principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Id.
IV.  Analysis 
 at 
228.  
 When considering the propriety of an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute, we must turn to the analytical 
structure set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron.  467 
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U.S. at 842-43.  “Under the familiar two-step Chevron 
inquiry, first, if the statute is clear we must give effect to 
Congress’[s] unambiguous intent, and, second, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, we defer 
to an implementing agency’s reasonable interpretation of that 
statute.”  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen.
 Regarding the first step, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions 
which are contrary to clear congressional intent.  If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given 
effect.”  
, 622 F.3d 341, 348 
(3d Cir. 2010).   
Chevron
 We have adopted limitations on the first step of the 
, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).   
Chevron
 
 test.   
As this Court has observed, “a blind adherence 
to the literal meaning of a statute [could] lead to 
a patently absurd result that no rational 
legislature could have intended. Following the 
letter, rather than the spirit, of the law in such 
cases would go against the court’s role of 
construing statutes to effectuate the legislature’s 
intent.” 
Barrios v. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 272, 277 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 
(3d Cir. 2002) (in turn citing United States v. Schneider, 14 
F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1994) (“It is the obligation of the court 
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to construe a statute to avoid absurd results, if alternative 
interpretations are available and consistent with the legislative 
purpose.”)). 
 As to the second step, the Supreme Court stated that a 
“court need not conclude that the agency construction was the 
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the 
construction, or even the reading the court would have 
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial 
proceeding.”  Chevron
 Petitioner and amicus argue that the language of the 
statute is clear, and this Court therefore need only read the 
statute in order to conclude that it does not apply to him.  
That is, according to Petitioner, he was never “admitted” to 
this country “as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”  Although his status is that of “an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence,” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(20), he has never been admitted to the United States, 
since he originally entered the country illegally. 
, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.   
 Although asserting that we need not go beyond the 
plain meaning of the statute, Petitioner also argues that the 
statute’s legislative history supports his position.  Noting that 
Congress amended § 1182(h), § 1229b(a) and the definition 
of “admission” in § 1101(a)(13)(A) at the same time, 
Petitioner concludes that the differences among these sections 
indicate Congress’s clear intent to differentiate among them.  
Specifically, Petitioner notes that Congress used “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” in § 1229b(a) without 
using “admitted” as an additional modifier, while it used both 
terms in § 1182(h).   
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 We agree with Petitioner that the statute is clear and 
unambiguous.  In § 1182(h), Congress used specific terms 
defined in the statute.  Absent any indication to the contrary, 
we must presume that Congress intended to give those terms 
the meaning ascribed to them elsewhere in the statute.  See, 
e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 
(2006) (“[W]e presume that the same term has the same 
meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute.”).  
Cf. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (“When 
a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase 
its ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
130 S.Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010))).  Further, as the Supreme Court 
has often stated, “courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain
 Congress clearly only placed limitations on waivers 
available to aliens who were previously admitted as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.  This phrase 
requires not only a prior admission to the United States, but 
also that the prior admission has been made while the alien 
was in the status of a lawful permanent resident.  We perceive 
no other meaning from the language of the statute.     
, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 
(1992).   
 The government holds a different view, arguing that § 
1182(h) is ambiguous and therefore cannot be read in 
isolation, but must be read in the context of the entire statute.  
Examining the full statute, the government, like the BIA, 
concludes that the date of Hanif’s adjustment of status should 
be considered to be his date of admission.  Therefore, 
according to the government, the BIA correctly concluded 
that Hanif did not have more than seven years of residency, 
thus rendering him ineligible for the waiver.  
12 
 
 At first blush, the government’s argument has some 
appeal.  Pointing to the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b), 
which provides that “the Attorney General shall record the 
alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence as of the 
date the order of the Attorney General approving the 
application for the adjustment of status is made,” the 
government contends that Congress clearly stated that the 
date of the adjustment of status is the date of admission.  
When the Attorney General enters the order adjusting the 
status of the alien, “the Secretary of State shall reduce by one 
the number of the preference visas authorized to be issued 
under sections 1152 and 1153 of this title within the class to 
which the alien is chargeable for the fiscal year then current.”  
Id.
 The government also points to the legislative history of 
IIRIRA in support of its assertion that the date of the 
adjustment of status should be considered the date of 
admission.  The government focuses on two points:  (1) 
  However, upon closer inspection, this argument fails 
because Congress adopted specific definitions of “admission” 
and “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” which 
distinguish between the two terms.  Notably, in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A), Congress treated “admission” as an event 
or action, while in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) Congress regarded 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as an 
immigration status.  The date of gaining a new status is not 
the same as the date of the physical event of entering the 
country.  We perceive the recording requirement of § 1255(b) 
to be a ministerial provision relating to the monitoring and 
control of the number of visas available in any given year, 
rather than an effort by Congress to amend the definitions of 
“admitted” and “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” 
set forth in § 1101(a). 
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statements expressing Congress’s intent to streamline 
deportation through the amendments and (2) the fact that the 
House Conference Report accompanying IIRIRA indicated 
that the continuous residency requirements established in § 
1229b(a) should also be applied to § 1182(h). 
 While considering Congress’s intent with regard to 
maintaining some parallelism between § 1182(h) and § 
1229b(a) could potentially be appropriate, the language 
adopted in the two sections does not support the 
government’s position since the two sections differ in a 
significant way.  Section 1229b(a) provides that  
[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal in 
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable from the United States if the alien-- 
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence for not less than 5 years,  
(2) has resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status, and  
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated 
felony.  
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
 
 As we recently observed in Nelson v. Att’y Gen., 685 
F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2012), the clear language of this section 
distinguishes between “an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” and an alien “admitted in any status.”  
In Nelson, we noted that, contrary to Nelson’s argument,   
14 
 
the “after having been admitted in any status” 
language simply means that the seven-year 
period need not accrue entirely after admission 
as a lawful permanent resident.  The “in any 
status” phrase could show congressional 
recognition that an alien may initially be 
admitted to the United States in some other 
status (e.g., on a student visa, as a refugee, or 
some other nonimmigrant status) and receive an 
adjustment of status to a permanent resident 
sometime later.  Under this interpretation, the 
statutory language merely clarifies that such an 
alien does not begin accruing time towards the 
seven-year period only after his adjustment to 
permanent resident status.  Rather, the alien 
immediately begins accumulating time 
following his initial admission, regardless of the 
status.   
Id.
 Additionally, as Petitioner notes, Congress chose to 
not use “admitted” in conjunction with “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” in § 1229b(a), as it did in § 1182(h).  
The omission of this additional modifier creates a significant 
distinction between the two sections.   
 at 323 (emphasis omitted). 
“[W]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.” . . . We refrain from concluding 
here that the differing language in the two 
15 
 
subsections has the same meaning in each. We 
would not presume to ascribe this difference to 
a simple mistake in draftsmanship.   
 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting 
United States v. Wong Kim Bo
 The government further argues that a literal reading of 
the statute produces the absurd result of Hanif being an LPR 
who was never admitted to the country.
, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 
1972)).  Here, we cannot omit the additional modifier 
“admitted” from § 1182(h), nor can we insert it into § 
1229b(a) in order to conform the statute to the government’s 
interpretation.  Rather, we must read the statute as written, 
noting the differences between these two sections.   
8  In a slightly 
different context, we have considered whether a rational basis 
supports Congress’s enactment of § 1182(h).  DeLeon-
Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633 (3d Cir. 2002).  In De 
Leon-Reynoso
                                                 
 8 Similarly, the government suggests an absurd result 
would occur by applying Hanif’s interpretation since an alien 
entering the country without inspection would not be eligible 
for relief under § 1229b(a).  Given the fact that § 1229b(a) 
does not use “admitted” as a modifier for “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence,” we find the government’s 
reasoning on this point to be unpersuasive.  
, the petitioner argued that § 1182(h) violated 
the Equal Protection Clause since that section treated 
different LPRs differently.  Specifically,  
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De Leon argues that § 1182(h) violates the 
equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause by making an 
impermissible distinction between two 
categories of aliens who are not permitted to 
reside in the United States: those who have not 
previously been lawfully admitted to the United 
States (i.e., non-LPRs) and those who have 
been previously admitted to the United States 
but have not resided in the United States for 
seven consecutive years before removal 
proceedings are initiated (LPRs). 
Id. at 638.  We found § 1182(h) to be constitutional, 
observing that since “Congress conceivably had good reasons 
to create the § 1182(h) distinction, we hold that the distinction 
survives rational basis scrutiny.”  Id. at 640.  We did note that 
“[o]ur holding that the § 1182(h) distinction survives rational 
basis scrutiny should not be mistaken for an endorsement of 
the policy.”  
 The conclusion in 
Id. 
De Leon-Reynoso
 Even absent the holding in 
 limits our ability 
in the present case to consider whether the plain meaning of 
the statute produces an absurd result.  While concluding that a 
rational basis exists for treating different types of LPRs 
differently is not the same as deciding that a literal 
interpretation of the statute would produce an absurd result, 
our earlier decision is instructive.  Conceivably, Congress 
could have had reasons to treat LPRs differently based on 
whether or not they were admitted to the United States in that 
status.   
De Leon-Reynoso, we 
would not conclude that giving the statute its literal meaning 
17 
 
produces an absurd result.  We acknowledge that giving the 
statute its literal meaning results in situations such as here, 
where Hanif, having entered the United States illegally, 
technically was never “admitted” to the country as defined in 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).  However, Congress has long been aware 
of the fact that aliens may enter the country without 
inspection and later adjust to LPR status.9  The statute, in fact, 
allows for just this situation.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).  While 
we find this situation awkward, we cannot substitute our 
judgment for that of Congress. We can, and in fact, must, give 
the statute the meaning Congress intended.  Further, “‘[t]he 
fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the 
consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient 
reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.’”  
Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) (quoting 
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991)).  “In light of 
these plausible explanations . . . , we cannot say that 
adherence to the statute’s plain text would be absurd.”  
Fogelman
 Similarly, after finding the statute’s meaning to be 
clear, the Fifth Circuit considered whether this interpretation 
, 283 F.3d at 570. 
                                                 
 9 Congress acknowledged that aliens may attempt to 
enter the country without inspection in the definition section 
of the statute.  Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(vi) provides that “[a]n 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United 
States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the 
United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the 
alien-- . . . has not been admitted to the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”  
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would produce an absurd result, and found that it would not.  
Rather, the Fifth Circuit surmised that the distinction between 
aliens admitted to the United States as LPRs and aliens who 
convert to LPR status while in the country may have been 
Congress’s first step in reaching its goal of expediting the 
removal of criminal aliens.  Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545.10
 All other circuits that have considered the language of 
subsection (h) have reached the same conclusion as we do 
here; namely, that the statute clearly requires both an 
“admission” and that the “admission” have been made by “an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 
   
11
V. Conclusion 
   
 In sum, under the first step of the Chevron test, we find 
that the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous.  
Given the clarity of the statute, we need not reach the second 
step of the Chevron
                                                 
 10 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning on this point.  Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 
380, 389 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 test.  We will grant the petition, vacate 
the BIA’s decision and remand this matter to the BIA for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 11 Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 385-6; Martinez, 519 F.3d 
at 544, 546; Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 
(11th Cir. 2011).   
